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Résumé : Dans une lettre adressée à Bertrand Russell, le 17 mai 1905, Hugh
MacColl raconte avoir abandonné l’étude de la logique après 1884, pendant
près de treize ans, et explique que ce fut la lecture de l’ouvrage de Lewis
Carroll, Symbolic Logic (1896), qui “ralluma le vieux feu qu’il croyait éteint”.
Dès lors, il publie de nombreux articles contenant certaines de ses innova-
tions majeures en logique. L’objet de cet article est de discuter la familiar-
ité de MacColl et son appréciation du travail de Carroll, et de comprendre
comment cela l’amena à réinvestir le domaine de la logique. Rien n’indique
que les deux hommes se soient jamais rencontrés ou aient échangé une cor-
respondance personnelle. Cependant, MacColl recensa dans le journal The
Athenaeum plusieurs ouvrages de Carroll, essentiellement en géométrie et en
logique. Souvent, Carroll répondait aux critiques de MacColl dans les éditions
suivantes de ses ouvrages. Une discussion de ces sources fournit des éclaircisse-
ments intéressants sur les investigations mathématiques et logiques de MacColl
et Carroll.
Abstract: In a letter to Bertrand Russell, dated 17 May 1905, Hugh MacColl
tells how he abandoned the study of logic after 1884 for about thirteen years
and how it was the reading of Lewis Carroll’s Symbolic Logic (1896) that “rekin-
dled the old fire which [he] thought extinct.” From then onwards, he published
several papers containing some of his major logical innovations. The aim of this
paper is to discuss MacColl’s acquaintance with and appreciation of Carroll’s
work, and how that reading convinced him to come back into the realm of
logic. There is no evidence that the two men ever met or exchanged any per-
sonal correspondence. However, MacColl reviewed in The Athenaeum several
of Carroll’s books, mainly on geometry and logic. Often, Carroll replied to
MacColl’s criticisms in the following editions of his works. A discussion of
these sources provides interesting insights to MacColl’s (and Carroll’s) math-
ematical and logical investigations.
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It is well known that Hugh MacColl (1837-1909) interrupted his logical in-
vestigations around 1884 for about thirteen years, a period which he mainly de-
voted to literature. In a letter to Bertrand Russell (1872-1970), dated 17 May
1905, MacColl recalls this break and tells how it was the reading of Lewis
Carroll’s Symbolic Logic in 1896 that led him to reinstate his logical studies:
When, more than twenty-eight years ago, I discovered my Calculus
of Limits [. . . ], I regarded it at first as a purely mathematical sys-
tem restricted to purely mathematical questions. [. . . ] When I
found that my method could be applied to purely logical ques-
tions unconnected with the integral calculus or with probability, I
sent a second and a third paper to theMathematical Society, which
were both accepted, and also a paper toMind (published January
1880). [. . . ] I sent a fourth paper (in 1884) to the Math. Soc., on
the “Limits of Multiple Integrals,” which was also accepted. This
I thought would be my final contribution to logic or mathematics,
and, for the next twelve or thirteen years, I devoted my leisure
hours to general literature. Then a friend sent me Mr. Dodgson’s
(“Lewis Carroll’s” 1) Symbolic Logic, a perusal of which
rekindled the old fire which I thought extinct. My articles since
then I believe to be far more important from the point of view of
general logic than my earlier ones. [Astroh, Grattan-Guinness &
Read 2001, 93–94]
The aim of this paper is to discuss MacColl’s acquaintance with and appre-
ciation of Carroll’s work, and how that reading convinced him to come back
into the realm of logic. There is no evidence that the two men ever met or
exchanged any personal correspondence. Both mathematicians worked in rel-
ative isolation on the margins of the mathematical scene. They shared an
interest in educational issues and solving mathematical problems. 2 Their ac-
tivities made them interact face to face, however, through the London journal,
The Athenaeum. Indeed, MacColl acted as the main reviewer of mathematical
books for that journal in the 1880s and 1890s. 3 As such he reviewed anony-
1. “Lewis Carroll” is the pen name of Charles L. Dodgson (1832-1898). To avoid
confusion, in this paper we will use the pseudonym, Carroll, even when we are con-
cerned with works signed with his real name. However, the works signed with the real
name (Dodgson) and those signed with the pen name (Carroll) are listed separately
in the bibliography.
2. Both were active contributors to the “mathematical questions and solutions”
section of the Educational Times [Grattan-Guinness 1992]. At least once, they were
concerned with the very same question in probability [Abeles 1994, 213–218]. Later
on, MacColl replied to a logical problem published posthumously by Carroll [Abeles
2010, 184–185].
3. Reviews in The Athenaeum are anonymous. However, the editor’s marked
copies (now at City University Library, London) reveal the name of the reviewers.
No survey of MacColl’s reviews in this journal has yet been published. A look at
the marked copies shows, however, that MacColl reviewed most mathematical books
from the mid-1880s onwards. It might look surprising to see a minor mathematics
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mously most of Carroll’s mathematical books during that period, mainly on
geometry and logic. Often, Carroll replied to MacColl’s criticisms in the fol-
lowing editions of his works. A discussion of these connected sources provides
interesting insights to both Carroll’s and MacColl’s mathematical and logical
investigations. They also reveal influences on each other’s thinking in several
areas that they wrote about subsequently.
Carroll was the mathematical lecturer at Christ Church, Oxford. As such,
he was greatly interested in geometrical teaching and participated actively in
the debates of the time on the adequacy of Euclid’s Elements as a manual
for teaching purposes in schools and Colleges [Moktefi 2007b]. He argued for
Euclid against the new rival textbooks, but didn’t object to some changes
in Euclid’s text when appropriate, as long as the order of the theorems was
not violated. In 1888, however, he published A New Theory of Parallels,
a book where, as its title clearly indicates, he suggested a completely new
Euclidean parallel axiom [Dodgson 1888]. Two more editions of the book
appeared in the immediately subsequent years [Dodgson 1889 & 1891], and a
fourth appeared later in 1895 [Dodgson 1895a]. MacColl reviewed the three
first editions in The Athenaeum. In the following sections, we will first explore
the dominant themes that attracted his attention when he read A New Theory
of Parallels: the nature of axioms, the order in which axioms and theorems are
used, the meaning and use of the terms ‘infinity’ and ‘infinitesimal’, the role
of Archimedes’s axiom in a geometry, and the relationship between Euclidean
and non-Euclidean geometry.
It is important to keep in mind the time period when MacColl was review-
ing Carroll’s work on geometry (1888-1891). The non-Euclidean geometry of
Nikolai Lobachevsky (1792-1856) had begun to be widely known soon after
Jules Hoüel (1823-1886) published the first edition of his French translation
of it in 1863. Beginning in 1882 with the work of Moritz Pasch (1843-1930)
in his Vorlesungen über neuere Geometrie, and continuing with the work of
David Hilbert (1862-1943) in his Grundlagen der Geometrie (1899) which was
translated into French in 1900, and into English in 1902, the transition began
to occur from the older view of an axiom as a generally accepted principle
that is a self-evident truth to the modern view that an axiom is arbitrarily
chosen and deals with indefinable concepts about arbitrarily chosen objects
of thought. Thus, mathematics and formal logic each can be described as a
science of pure thought.
figure living in a foreign country act as the main mathematical reviewer for such
an established journal, a task that was for instance previously undertaken by the
London Professor of mathematics Augustus de Morgan (1806-1871) for over twenty
years (1850s-1860s). Hugh MacColl might have been recommended by his brother
Malcolm (1831-1907), who had previously reviewed some theological books for the
journal. He might also have benefitted from a “natural” sympathy by the editor of
the journal with whom he shared Scottish origins and even the name (although we
know of no direct family relation between them), for Norman MacColl (1843-1904)
was the editor of The Athenaeum from 1869 to 1901.
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The nature of axioms and how they are used
We commonly consider that the theorems of a mathematical system are
understood from its axioms and the logical machinery employed to deduce
them. Beginning in the second half of the 19th century the question arose of
how an axiom is to be understood. One possibility was that we believe the
axioms are true because some of the obvious theorems of the system can be
deduced from them. Each axiom is expressing something that is true about its
concepts and terms. We also trust the integrity of the mathematical system
itself because the less obvious and non-obvious theorems can then be deduced
from the axioms and from the obvious theorems. This is not really circu-
lar thinking, but more an assertion that a psychological element is involved
in understanding an axiom. The second possibility follows the earlier and
stricter Euclidean approach that only the terms and concepts in the axiom
matter, so that we understand an axiom only when, after suitable reflection,
we have a clear idea of the meaning of those terms and concepts, i. e. the
axiom expresses a self-evident truth. How then are axioms selected? In any
mathematical system there are some true theorems that are not dependent
on others. Because these theorems involve fundamental truths that do not
need to be proved, they become the candidates of choice for the axioms of
the mathematical system. These fundamental truths are not necessarily self-
evident except in the Euclidean approach to understanding an axiom, where
they would have to be. 4
In A New Theory of Parallels, Carroll chose as an equivalent to the
Euclidean parallel axiom, an axiom, number 6, the last in his set of axioms,
that states:
In every Circle, the inscribed equilateral Hexagon is greater [in
area] than any one of the Segments which lie outside it. [Dodgson
1888, Frontispiece]
Carroll used this axiom to prove Euc. I. 32 [Abeles 1995]. MacColl objected to
this axiom on several grounds and continued to criticize it even after Carroll
had modified it in response to his criticisms. In his review of the first edition,
MacColl questioned Carroll’s “implied assumption of the possibility of the in-
scribed equilateral hexagon,” that he asserts Euclid did not demonstrate until
Book IV, Proposition 15 of the Elements [MacColl 1888, 557].
MacColl clarified his objection to the axiom in his review of the second
edition of this book a year later, after Carroll had responded specifically, but
not by name, to his objection in the preface to this new edition. In that
preface, in response to another reviewer, Carroll had added at the bottom of
the page containing his offending axiom that “it is assumed to be theoretically
possible to inscribe an equilateral Hexagon in a Circle” [Dodgson 1889, xi].
Then answering MacColl, Carroll questioned whether the possibility needs to
be demonstrated:
4. For a penetrating analysis of self-evidence, see [Shapiro 2009].
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May we not assume (1) that the Magnitude ‘four right angles’
contains 6-6ths of itself; (2) that it is theoretically possible to draw
radii dividing it into these 6-6ths? Once grant me this, and I
ask no more. I have then the logical right to join the ends of
these radii, and to prove (by Euc. I. 4) that the chords are equal.
[Dodgson 1889, xi]
But MacColl still was not satisfied with Carroll’s statements in the preface
to this second edition. He rejoined that Carroll’s assumption conflicts with
Euclidean practice and asks him to keep within Euclid’s restrictions:
We objected that it was not consistent with the spirit or practice
of Euclid’s reasoning to assume the “theoretical possibility” of a
regular hexagon inscribed in a circle without first proving that
such a figure could be actually constructed from his three postu-
lates. Euclid’s restrictions may be arbitrary, unnecessary, cramp-
ing, vexatious, absurd—indeed, we think they deserve these and
many other epithets—but there they are, and if Mr. Dodgson ac-
cepts them he is bound to keep his assumptions within the bound-
aries which they prescribe. [MacColl 1889, 457]
The third edition of A New Theory of Parallels was published in 1890 and
it was really an expanded and revised edition of the book. Carroll modified
his problematic axiom, replacing the hexagon with a tetragon. In the preface
to the new edition, he responded to MacColl quite sarcastically, when he de-
scribed for the hexagon, the construction of an angle one sixth of four right
angles in size, using Euc. I. 1 to construct an equilateral triangle; then using
Euc. I. 9 to draw the bisectors of two of its angles; then post. 1 to join the
points of intersection to the third vertex; then Euc. I. 4 to prove the three
angles at the third vertex are equal; finally to conclude that each of these an-
gles is one third, (and that therefore its half is one sixth) of four right angles
[Dodgson 1890, xiii].
Besides objecting to Carroll’s unnecessary sarcasm, MacColl remained un-
satisfied. In his much longer review of the third edition he criticized Carroll’s
use of propositions, in addition to postulates, to construct the new figure, the
square. He wrote:
An axiom founded on propositions, however few and elementary,
strikes us as somewhat of an anomaly. [MacColl 1891, 196]
Then he gives his own development “to find a simple substitute for Euclid’s
twelfth axiom” by exchanging its order with I. 30, then proving I. 29. “The
twelfth axiom of Euclid could then be proved in place of his thirtieth propo-
sition so that there would be hardly any disturbance in the accepted arrange-
ment of matter ” [MacColl 1891, 196–197]. By way of explanation, Euclid’s
fifth postulate, the parallel postulate, came to be known in England as the
twelfth axiom from the well regarded and popular edition of the Elements by
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the Scottish mathematician, Robert Simson (1687-1768), which had first ap-
peared in 1756. Simson’s text contains three postulates and twelve axioms.
Of the first ten axioms in the edition reproduced in the 19th century by Isaac
Todhunter (1820-1884), only five can be attributed to Euclid. And of the last
two of the twelve axioms, Simson’s twelfth axiom was Euclid’s fifth postulate.
Alluding to Carroll’s sarcastic comments about his criticisms, MacColl
went on to say that, “Postulates and axioms are permissions to do or to as-
sume certain things, and are therefore, the opposite of restrictions. The restric-
tions of Euclid arise from the paucity of his postulates and axioms, a paucity
which [he thinks] regrettable” [MacColl 1891, 197]. It seems quite clear that
MacColl is a strict Euclidean in that he believes that an axiom should express
a fundamental self-evident truth. Carroll, on the other hand, believes that a
psychological element is involved in knowing an axiom as he explained in the
preface to the first edition of his book:
I shall be told, no doubt, that this is too bizarre and unprece-
dented an Axiom—that it is an appeal to the eye and not to the
reason. That it is somewhat bizarre I am willing to admit—and
am by no means sure that this is not rather a merit than a defect.
But, as to its being an appeal to the eye, what is ‘two straight
Lines cannot enclose a space’ [a fact included in the meaning of
postulate 1: to draw a straight line from any point to any point]
but an appeal to the eye? What is ‘all right angles are equal’
[postulate 4] but an appeal to the eye? [Dodgson 1888, xv]
What exactly did Carroll have in mind when he created his axiom 6? First,
it appears that he selected a hexagon because of all the Euclidean polygonal
constructions that of a regular hexagon is the simplest. 5 But there appears to
be another reason. In hyperbolic geometry there is an upper limit to the area
of a triangle, but there is no upper limit to the lengths of its sides. Since a
polygon can be triangulated and its area equals the sum of the areas of these
triangles, eventually the sides of the hexagon will become very long while its
area will reach a maximum. In a sufficiently large circle the area of a segment
will exceed the area of the inscribed hexagon. From the center of the circle
circumscribing the hexagon, the hexagon has a unique triangulation while for
an inscribed square (which does not exist in hyperbolic geometry) there are
two such triangulations. As he indicated in a diary entry dated 8 April 1888,
he was initially considering a different formulation for his axiom:
My Axiom has taken many forms, the last a discovery of this
evening, “if an equilateral triangle be inscribed in a circle, it cannot
be made to lie partly within it, with each vertex outside, and the
circle cutting each side in two points.” [Wakeling 2004, 390]
5. The construction of a square does not occur until Euc. 1. 46. And unlike the
square, the hexagon construction does not require the parallel postulate.
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He alluded to this argument in Appendix IV of the first edition of A New
Theory of Parallels where he provided greater detail, calling it a Will-o’-the-
Wisp (but omitted it in the third edition). In the end he settled on the
inscribed hexagon formulation but concluded that:
[A]ny polygon will do, and any ratio between it and the out-lying
Segment, so long as it is a finite ratio. [Dodgson 1888, 61; 1890,
74–75]
MacColl may have been influenced by his exchange with Carroll on the nature
of axioms. This becomes apparent in his late writings on geometry, particularly
an article written at the end of 1909 and published posthumously in Mind the
following year. In section II, devoted to “Axioms, Inference, Implication”,
MacColl wrote:
What is an axiom? No clear line of demarcation can be drawn
between an axiom and any other general proposition or formula
that is known and admitted to be true [. . . ] A proposition that
may appear axiomatic to one person may appear doubtful to an-
other, until he has obtained a satisfactory proof of it; after which
he treats it as an axiom in all subsequent researches [. . . ] To
an omniscient mind would not all true propositions be equally
axiomatic? Would it not be absurd to speak of such a mind as
inferring B from A? This, of course, is an extreme case, but such
cases are precisely those that most effectively test the validity of
a principle. [MacColl 1910, 193]
This passage suggests that MacColl has given up his belief that an axiom must
express a fundamental self-evident truth, and he has accepted the idea that
people differ in what they view as axioms as opposed to propositions. MacColl
goes on to say that, “strict Euclideans consider no proof valid [. . . ] if it takes
anything for granted that is not founded on Euclid’s twelve axioms, although as
a matter of fact, Euclid himself, in several of his formal proofs, tacitly assumes
axioms which are absent from his given list” [MacColl 1910, 193]. These are
the restrictions we referred to earlier (that MacColl had alluded to in his
last review of A New Theory of Parallels). Further evidence that MacColl
may have been influenced by Carroll’s views is that in the same paper he
describes axioms as “fundamental formulae of appeal” [MacColl 1910, 196], a
term difficult to understand except when cast in the light of Carroll’s statement
that his axiom is an appeal to the eye rather than to the mind. These are the
permissions that MacColl had also alluded to in this same last review.
Infinity, infinitesimal, the Archimedean
axiom, and non-Euclidean geometry
It is interesting to note, however, that when MacColl reviewed the three
editions of A New Theory of Parallels he did not analyze Carroll’s unusual for-
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mulation of the Euclidean parallel axiom nor did he include any mention of the
appendices in that book where Carroll dealt with infinities and infinitesimals.
For the superiority of his axiom, Carroll claimed:
While every other Theory (that I have seen), which attempts to
supersede Euclid’s 12th [parallel] Axiom, introduces the ideas of
Infinities and Infinitesimals, mine dispenses wholly with their aid,
and deals with nothing but what is, by universal consent, abso-
lutely within the field of Human Reason. [Dodgson 1890, xiv]
Although he was silent here, MacColl discussed the issue of infinity and in-
finitesimal in a subsequent review of Russell’s Essay on the Foundations of
Geometry (1897) that appeared in The Athenaeum in January 1898. Russell
discussed the validity of non-Euclidean geometries whose principal writers he
named as Lobachevsky, Carl Friedrich Gauss (1777-1855), Bernhard Riemann
(1826-1866), Hermann von Helmholtz (1821-1894) and Arthur Cayley (1821-
1895) [Russell 1897]. MacColl identified as the key issue of the book, Russell’s
belief that certain axioms, particularly the parallel axiom, should be “regarded
as empirical laws, derived from the investigation and measurement of our ac-
tual space, and true only [. . . ] within the limits set by errors of observation”
[MacColl 1898, 25]. MacColl, asserting that Russell’s view is based on his
erroneous notion of an infinitesimal, writes:
Those who assert the possibility of discovering error in Euclid’s
axioms by a conceivably more refined method of measurement
forget (as Mr. Russell appears to do) [. . . ] that the infinitesimal
dx is never synonymous with zero, that it is wholly relative, and
has no fixed and absolute magnitude. The infinitesimal dx has
simply any magnitude, great or small, we choose to assign to it,
consistently with the limitation that the variable x, with which
we compare it is (when not zero) infinite in comparison. The in-
finitesimal dx may, in fact [. . . ] have any value, from the millionth
part of the diameter of an hypothetical atom to a million times the
distance of the farthest star that will ever become visible through
the most powerful telescope. [MacColl 1898, 25]
MacColl goes on to say that Russell’s “thoughts may be correct, but the words
in which he expresses them border upon self-contradiction. [. . . ] Whence
come these contradictions? [. . . ] they arise solely from the unnecessary am-
biguity created by confounding the ‘infinitesimal’ with ‘zero” ’ [MacColl 1898,
26]. However, MacColl’s notions about infinitesimals and infinities were some-
what odd and sometimes incorrect. He had discussed these ideas in “The
calculus of limits” [MacColl 1904], and again in “Symbolic Reasoning (VIII)”
(1906) where, for example, he asserted that “the symbol 0 represents [. . . ] the
death of a real infinitesimal ratio h in passing from the positive to the negative
state” [MacColl 1906b, 506].
In contrast to Russell, Carroll’s view of axioms is quite different. In the
Supplement to Euclid and His Modern Rivals from 1885, Carroll gave what
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amounts to his definition of an axiom: “ [It] always requests the voluntary
assent of the reader to some truth, for which no proof is offered, and which
he is not logically compelled to grant” [Dodgson 1885, 351]. He goes on to
say that accepting any axiom that may be proposed “largely depends on the
amount of truth he [the reader] has already grasped in connection with it”
[Dodgson 1885, 351]. So, Carroll does not subscribe to the idea that they are
empirical laws subject to verification, but rather that they must be acceptable
to the faculties of reason which, by its nature, cannot apprehend infinities and
infinitesimals. MacColl seems to be more in agreement with Carroll’s view. It
was primarily for this purpose that Carroll chose his axiom 6 as a substitute
for Euclid’s parallel axiom. It is a closed form that deals with finite area and
not with lines, and is unique in this respect.
In view of MacColl’s and Carroll’s lack of clear and correct ideas about
the nature of infinitesimals, it is remarkable that Carroll arrived at the role
the Archimedean axiom plays in a geometry. Euclid stated this axiom as the
first proposition in Book X. Using Euclid’s definitions of ratio, i. e. relative
magnitude, which are numbers 3 and 4 in Book V, Carroll reasoned correctly
that definition 4 was meant to exclude the relation of a finite magnitude to an
infinitely great or infinitely small one, where both are magnitudes of the same
kind. And he saw that Euclid employed this definition in his proof of X. 1. So,
Carroll was one of the few mathematicians of his time to understand that the
Archimedean axiom excludes infinitesimals, and by implication that hyperbolic
geometry, because it admits infinitesimals, is necessarily non-Archimedean.
Carroll wrote:
My conclusion, then, is that, in Book X. Prop. 1, Euclid is
limiting his view to the case of two homogeneous Magnitudes
which are such that neither of them is infinitely greater than
the other [. . . ] that he is contemplating Finite Magnitudes
only. [Dodgson 1890, 42]
The importance of Carroll’s discovery became apparent in the independent
work of Giuseppe Veronese (1854-1917). Just as one can exclude the parallel
axiom from the rest of the axioms of Euclidean geometry to investigate what
other geometries are possible, so one can exclude the Archimedean axiom and
obtain the non-Archimedean geometries of which Veronese’s 1890 geometry
was the first one. 6
However, Carroll’s discussion of area in the context of non-finite objects
like strips and sectors was largely incorrect. He made comparisons between
finite and infinite areas that led to paradoxical, actually fallacious results,
because he handled infinities as if they were magnitudes having a definite size.
He based his understanding of the infinite and the infinitesimal primarily on
6. Pasch was probably the first mathematician to fully understand the significance
of Archimedes’s axiom [Schlimm 2010]. Russell had discussed Pasch’s book in his
Principles of Mathematics [Russell 1903, 393–403], but it is doubtful that MacColl
read this book.
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the work of the Swiss mathematician Louis Bertrand (1731-1812) who used
the notion of infinite area [Bertrand 1778]. Carroll came to know Bertrand’s
work because Adrien-Marie Legendre (1752-1833) used it in an attempt to
prove Euclid’s parallel axiom. In an unpublished letter, dated 2 April 1878, to
the Oxford mathematician Wallis Hay Laverty (1847-1928), Carroll discussed
Legendre’s proof [Dodgson 1878].
In spite of their disagreements, Carroll and MacColl were both Euclideans.
MacColl stated clearly his strong preference for Euclidean geometry with an
implicit rejection of hyperbolic non-Euclidean geometry when he wrote in his
1910 paper that:
The Euclidean geometry seems to me to be the only true one,
not merely because it is admittedly the simplest and most con-
venient, but also, and chiefly, because it is the only system that
frankly accepts the customary conventions of ordinary language.
[MacColl 1910, 188]
MacColl had already alluded to this belief in his review of Russell’s Essay
on the Foundations of Geometry when he wrote that the non-Euclideans’ “so-
called straight lines are not straight lines in the ordinary sense, but two great
circles of an infinite sphere, or some other curves of infinitesimal (but not
quite zero) curvature [. . . ] his familiarity [. . . ] with their peculiar ways of
thinking leads him occasionally [. . . ] into inconsistency of language, if not
into positive error” [MacColl 1898, 26]. Carroll’s rejection of hyperbolic non-
Euclidean geometry was consistent with his conception of the nature of human
reasoning, i. e. the impossibility of picturing two parallel lines produced to
infinity. So we see that both Carroll and MacColl agreed in their negative
assessments of non-Euclidean geometry, but not entirely for the same reasons.
The barbershop problem
Despite their exchanges in print on geometry, it seems that Carroll and
MacColl didn’t know each other. Indeed, the barbershop controversy that
occurred in the British logical scene in the subsequent years, with no par-
ticipation by MacColl at its beginning, suggests that MacColl was not per-
sonally acquainted at all with Carroll or with the British logicians in the
early 1890s, although he was familiar with John Venn (1834-1923), William
S. Jevons (1835-1882) and Charles S. Peirce (1839-1914) in the early 1880s
and with Russell in the early 1900s.
The barbershop problem was Carroll’s first publication in the journalMind.
It is the transcription of a dispute which opposed him to the Oxford Professor
of Logic John Cook Wilson (1849-1915). The two men debated regularly on
various topics in geometry, chances, and logic. The dispute which led to the
barbershop problem began around the end of 1892. Despite their exchanges
during the next year, the two men never agreed. Carroll asked Wilson for
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an accepted transcript of the problem, which he obtained in February 1894.
Then, he distributed copies of the problem to his colleagues and friends, in
Oxford and elsewhere, and asked them for their opinion, in order to collect
and compare their solutions. 7 Recipients included: Venn, Henry Sidgwick
(1838-1900), James Welton (1854-1942) and Francis H. Bradley (1846-1924).
The contradictory opinions that Carroll collected from his correspondence en-
couraged him to publish the problem, as he explains in a note annexed to his
Mind paper:
The paradox, of which the foregoing paper is an ornamental pre-
sentment, is, I have reason to believe, a very real difficulty in the
Theory of Hypotheticals. The disputed point has been for some
time under discussion by several practised logicians, to whom I
have submitted it; and the various and conflicting opinions, which
my correspondence with them has elicited, convince me that the
subject needs further consideration, in order that logical teachers
and writers may come to some agreement as to what Hypotheticals
are, and how they ought to be treated. [Carroll 1894, 438]
The problem was as follows: there are three men (Allen, Brown and Carr)
working in a barbershop. It is known that at least one man should be in the
shop, hence:
(1) If Carr is out, then (if Allen is out, then Brown is in).
Also, it is known that Allen can’t leave the shop without being accompanied
by Brown, hence:
(2) If Allen is out, then Brown is out.
Suppose that Carr is out. From (1), it follows that:
(3) If Allen is out, then Brown is in.
The proposition (3) is considered as incompatible with (2) which is known to
be true. Hence proposition (3) is false. From (1), by contraposition, it follows
that Carr is in the shop (which contradicts the initial hypothesis that Carr
was out). From this absurdity, one concludes that Carr can’t leave the shop
and should necessarily be inside. This result is paradoxical because it is easy
to show that Carr can leave the shop without contradicting any of the rules
(1) and (2), as long as Allen is in the shop.
The debate that followed the publication of this problem focuses on the
assumption that the two propositions “If Allen is out, then Brown is in” and “If
Allen is out, then Brown is out” were incompatible. The modern logician will
clearly see here what is known to him as the paradoxes of material implication.
Indeed, Russell used the barbershop problem in his Principles of Mathematics
to illustrate his principle that a false proposition implies all others [Russell
7. On the genesis of the barbershop problem, see [Moktefi 2007a]. Different ver-
sions of the problem are reproduced in [Bartley 1986, 449–465] & [Abeles 2010, 111–
128].
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1903, 18]. We do not aim to discuss the problem here. The interesting point
is that the barbershop problem continued, after its publication, to be widely
commented about by logicians. 8 Venn was one of the first to discuss it in
print, in the second edition of his Symbolic Logic, where he writes:
This particular aspect of the question will very likely be familiar
to some of my readers from a problem recently circulated, for
comparison of opinions, amongst logicians. As the proposer is,
to the general reader, better known in a very different branch of
literature, I will call it Alice’s Problem. [Venn 1894, 442]
Venn confirms in this passage that the problem circulated between the British
logicians of the time. It seems, however, that MacColl did not participate in
this wide debate. He probably discovered it through Venn, as suggested by his
first reference to the problem in 1897:
To show the working of this logical calculus of three dimensions I
may take the following problem, which Dr. Venn in his Symbolic
Logic (second edition, p. 442) calls “Alice’s Problem,” and which
I understand has (under another form) been already discussed by
logicians, but with varying conclusions. [MacColl 1897, 501–502]
By 1897, the barbershop problem had already been discussed by various au-
thors in the journal Mind, but MacColl was not yet among them. This late
interest is comprehensible: MacColl was not an active reader of the mathe-
matical and philosophical journals of his time, although he continued to review
books for The Athenaeum. He certainly had access to some British (and for-
eign) periodicals at the Merridew Library, founded in Boulogne-sur-Mer by the
British librarian Henry Melville-Merridew (1826-1879) who lived there. But
MacColl’s reading was not regular as he explained in a letter to Bradley on
14 December 1904 [Keene 1999, 308]. Moreover, when the Barbershop debate
occurred, MacColl was no longer involved in the study of logic and was more
interested in fiction, as he told Russell in the letter quoted at the opening of
this paper. Of course, the historian has to deal with MacColl’s testimony with
caution. Still, MacColl’s publications record confirms that he returned to the
study of logic at the end of 1896, the year Carroll published his Symbolic Logic.
Indeed, that year MacColl published his first logical writings since the mid-
1880s and continued in the following years to contribute actively to various
mathematical and philosophical journals. Ultimately, he published in 1906 his
only logic book: Symbolic Logic and its Applications, where he gave a large
overview of his logical theory [MacColl 1906a]. 9
In the 1890s, MacColl was the main reviewer of mathematical books in
The Athenaeum. Until 1896, however, he didn’t review books on logic. These
8. All of the responses to the barbershop problem, published between 1894 and
1905 in Mind, are reproduced in [Abeles 2010, 129–183].
9. The book is reproduced in [Rahman & Redmond 2007, 79–226] together with
most of MacColl’s other logical writings. The editor’s introduction provides an in-
teresting overview of MacColl’s contributions to logic. On this, see also [Astroh
& Read 1998].
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were customarily attributed to other regular reviewers and were usually no-
ticed in the ‘Literature’ section of the journal, contrary to the mathematics
books reviewed by MacColl in the ‘Science’ section. 10 It is therefore a kind of
“historical accident” to see MacColl reviewing Lewis Carroll’s Symbolic Logic
in 1896, especially as Carroll signed it with his literary pseudonym, not with
the real name (Dodgson) that he usually used for his mathematical works.
Carroll tried his best to keep secret his real identity and denied in print any
connection between the two names. However, it was probably a public secret
in the 1890s that the author of the Alice tales was Dodgson, the Oxford math-
ematician. MacColl himself alluded to Alice in his 1891 review of the third
edition of A New Theory of Parallels, although the book was signed ‘Dodgson’.
It is certain that Carroll did not appreciate this allusion:
[W]e strongly recommend non-mathematicians as well as mathe-
maticians to read his witty and ingenious ‘Curiosa,’ which (if their
experience agrees with ours) they will find as entertaining as little
Alice found the curiosa of Wonderland. [MacColl 1891, 197]
It seems likely that MacColl was asked to review Carroll’s logic book mainly
because of his acquaintance with the author’s previous works. In addition
to his reviews of Carroll’s successive editions of A New Theory of Parallels,
discussed earlier in this paper, MacColl reviewed in 1893 another mathemat-
ical book by Carroll, Pillow Problems, a collection of seventy-two problems
“solved, in the head, while lying awake at night” [Dodgson 1895b, xiii]. The
last problem is particularly intriguing and was assumed by MacColl to be
“more intended as a joke than as a real question admitting a definite answer”
[MacColl 1893, 557]. It has since given rise to several interpretations and com-
mentaries. 11 Both A New Theory of Parallels and Pillow Problems reached a
fourth edition in 1895, but apparently neither was reviewed by MacColl.
Symbolic logic
MacColl’s review of Symbolic Logic appeared in October 1896. It was based
on the first edition of the book (having a preface dated January 1896). In the
meantime, Carroll published two further editions (the preface of the third
edition is dated 20 July 1896). A fourth and final edition appeared later at
the beginning of 1897 (but the preface is dated Christmas 1896) and contained
some changes which might have been motivated by MacColl’s review, although
Carroll never refers to him explicitly. It is, however, certain that Carroll read
MacColl’s review carefully as he wrote a long response which unfortunately
10. There is one exception: in 1892, MacColl reviewed a logic book by Edward
T. Dixon (1862-1935): An Essay on Reasoning [MacColl 1892b], together with a
mathematical treatise on The Foundations of Geometry by the same author [MacColl
1892a]. Both reviews appeared in the ‘Science’ section however.
11. On Carroll’s pillow problems, and particularly the 72th problem, see [Seneta
1993] & [Dale 1999, 447–464].
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has not been published and did not survive [Anonymous 1898]. In his review,
MacColl says that he appreciated the exposition of the book but considered
that its author didn’t go beyond the existing logical theories of the time:
Before offering any detailed criticism of Lewis Carroll’s methods
we may state certain favourable points which his book undoubt-
edly possesses. It is well arranged, its expositions are lucid, it
has an excellent stock of examples—many of them worked out,
and not a few witty and amusing; and its arguments, even when
wrong, are always acute and well worth weighing. [. . . ] On the
whole, though the author has unquestionably written an interest-
ing and useful little work, his proposed symbolic method does not
appear to possess any advantages over some other methods that
have preceded it; but, of course, we cannot say what important
surprises parts ii. and iii. of his system may have in store for us
when they make their appearance. [MacColl 1896, 520–521]
MacColl’s general judgment is comprehensible as he was reviewing a book
that Carroll wrote in such a way as to be understood by a wide audience.
Carroll himself considered the content of the book as elementary, but warned
that the second and third parts of his logic trilogy will address advanced and
transcendental logic respectively. MacColl is, however, severe when he says
that Carroll’s method has no advantages over existing methods. In fact, in
the bulk of the review, MacColl himself recognized that Carroll developed ele-
gant and effective symbolism and diagrams to represent relations of classes. 12
What MacColl really did reproach Carroll for is that he followed his contem-
poraries in working with a logic of classes, which differs from MacColl’s own
propositional approach.
It is well known that MacColl developed a propositional notation, which
he believed would improve (and thus should supersede) the mainstream sym-
bolic approach inherited from George Boole (1815-1864). Peirce and Ernst
Schröder (1841-1902) were sympathetic with MacColl’s work. In Britain how-
ever, it had been virulently criticized by Jevons and Venn who both defended
an equational notation where letters represent terms or classes. There is no
evidence that Carroll ever knew about MacColl’s early work on logic, although
he might have seen some references to him in logical treatises by other authors.
Carroll’s notation was different from those of his predecessors as it requires
the use of subscripts to express the existence (or not) of classes. Carroll did
occasionally use a propositional notation, but his book expresses primarily a
logic where letters represent classes, not propositions as MacColl would have
wished. Indeed, in his review of Symbolic Logic, MacColl takes advantage of
his anonymity and maintains that propositional calculus (and particularly his
own notation for it) was better and more convenient:
12. For an overview of Carroll’s contributions to logic, see [Moktefi 2008] & [Abeles
2010].
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Of the various proposed notations in symbolic logic, the most
convenient and symmetrical in our view is that adopted by
Mr. MacColl, who (contrary, we believe, to all his predecessors
in this field) insists that the simplest as well as the most effective
symbolic system is that in which each single letter denotes not
a class and not a property but a complete proposition, i. e. an
assertion or denial. [. . . ] Nothing so well illustrates the disadvan-
tages of a system of symbolic logic in which single letters repre-
sent classes or properties (instead of propositions) as the way in
which logicians are sometimes obliged to twist and torture simple
sentences in order to adapt them for syllogistic reasoning. For
example, Lewis Carroll paraphrases the simple proposition “John
is not well” into the astounding assertion that all Johns are men
who are not well, as if the illness of one member of that numerous
and widely scattered family must necessarily involve the illness
of all! Among the many Johns of Lewis Carroll’s acquaintance is
there really not one who enjoys good health? [MacColl 1896, 520]
MacColl refers here to an individual proposition used by Carroll to explain
how to write a given proposition in a normal form. The proposition is: “John
is not well.” In the first edition of his book, Carroll explains that the subject
of this proposition is the class “Johns” which includes all persons referred to
by the name “John”, and then writes it in the following normal form:
All Johns are men who are not well. [Carroll 1896a, 17]
In the second edition however, Carroll changed his mind and followed a sug-
gestion given to him by his colleague George Osborn (1864-1932) [Dodgson
1896]. He explains that the subject is a one Member Class shaped by the
“John” referred to in the proposition. The normal form becomes:
All Johns are not-well. [Carroll 1896b, 16]
Carroll maintained this form in the third edition of the book [Carroll 1896c,
12]. However, in the fourth edition (which followed the publication of
MacColl’s review), Carroll again changed his normal form, in accordance with
MacColl’s above criticism, to make it unambiguous as to what is the subject
of the proposition:
Let us take, as an example, the Proposition “John is not well.”
This of course implies that there is an Individual, to whom
the speaker refers when he mentions “John,” and whom the lis-
tener knows to be referred to. Hence the Class “men referred
to by the speaker when he mentions ‘John” ’ is a one-Member
Class, and the Proposition is equivalent to “All the men, who
are referred to by the speaker when he mentions ‘John’, are not
well.” [Carroll 1897, 10]
Carroll’s difficulties here come partly from his failure to distinguish between
a single thing and a one-member-class [Carroll 1897, 2–3]. A class in Carroll’s
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logic is a collection of things, not a set (as modern logicians understand it).
As such, a single thing coincides with the one-member-class, and more impor-
tantly there are no classes without individuals. This conception leaves no room
for a null class properly. Venn avoids the difficulty by pointing out that logic
symbols represent strictly compartments, in which classes may be put, and
are not classes themselves [Venn 1894, 119–120]. Consequently, there are no
null classes, but merely empty compartments. Carroll and MacColl handled
the problem otherwise.
Both Carroll and MacColl assumed the universe to contain things which
do really exist and things which do not really exist. The latter are said to be
imaginary by Carroll [Carroll 1897, 11]. Hence, the classes “Things” (which is
the Universe) and “Things that exist” denote different extensions. Carroll in-
sists on the mental nature of the processes (division and classification) he uses
to form classes. As such, they do not ask classes to contain existing things. All
they need is to contain things, whatever be their real existence. MacColl tack-
les the problem on similar grounds. He might have been inspired by Carroll’s
theory, but there is no way to establish that with certainty. MacColl considers
too that the Universe contains both existing and not existing things:
Let e1, e2, e3, etc. (up to any number of individuals mentioned
in our argument or investigation) denote the universe of real exis-
tences. Let 01, 02, 03, etc., denote our universe of non-existences,
that is to say, of unrealities, such as centaurs, nectar, ambrosia,
fairies, with self-contradictions, such as round squares, square
circles, flat spheres, etc., including, I fear, the non-Euclidean
Geometry of four dimensions and other hyper-spatial geometries.
Finally, let S1, S2, S3, etc., denote our Symbolic Universe, or
“Universe of Discourse,” composed of all things real or unreal that
are named or expressed by words or other symbols in our argu-
ment or investigation. By this definition we assume our Symbolic
Universe (or “Universe of discourse”) to consist of our Universe of
realities, e1, e2, e3, etc., together with our universe of unrealities,
01, 02, 03, etc., when both these enter into our argument. [MacColl
1905, 74]
Russell objected to this approach on the ground that MacColl was confusing
two meanings of existence: in philosophy and life, existence means real exis-
tence. So that: Aristotle exists while Hamlet doesn’t. In mathematics and
symbolic logic, however, existence is applied only to classes which are said to
exist if they contain members [Russell 1905, 398]. It follows that only the null
class is considered as non-existent in logic because it contains no individuals.
Carroll defined the existence of classes too, in addition to that of individuals.
Contrary to Russell, however, his definitions were related to each other. A
class is said to be real if it contains things existing really, and is said to be
imaginary if it contains only imaginary things [Carroll 1897, 2]. Consequently,
an imaginary class is not a null class.
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In spite of their analogous conceptions of existence, Carroll and MacColl
had opposite views on the existential import of propositions. This issue forms
MacColl’s second important criticism in his review of Carroll’s Symbolic Logic.
Indeed, Carroll considered that universal affirmative propositions have exis-
tential import, a position severely attacked by MacColl:
Hence, according to Lewis Carroll’s ruling, the assertion “All S
is P ,” if correct, implies that S really exists. Now there is a
certain theorem, generally (we will not rashly say universally)
accepted as valid, which does not seem to accept this ruling with
the meekness that it ought. The theorem is that “A is A.” It will
generally be admitted, we think, that “All non-existent things are
non-existent”; yet, according to the author, this proposition would
imply that non-existent things really exist: a rather staggering
assertion in the prosaic world of our experience, though the most
fundamental of all axioms in Wonderland. [MacColl 1896 , 520]
Carroll was conscious of the difficulties raised by his theory. Indeed, he limited
it in the third edition of his book to propositions of relation where the terms
are “two Species of the same Genus, such that each of the two Names conveys
the idea of some Attribute not conveyed by the other” [Carroll 1896c, 14].
This restriction eliminates the propositions of the kind used by MacColl in his
criticism, from the scope of his logic treatise. Still, Carroll had always been
in trouble with the issue of existential import, even if he had maintained the
same position since his early symbolic investigations in the 1880s. In his first
logic book, The Game of Logic (1887), he already attributed existential import
to I propositions (of the form “Some x are y”) but none to E propositions (of
the form “No x are y”). Propositions of the form “All x are y” are double
however: they assert that “Some x are y” and “No x are not-y”. Consequently,
A propositions (of the form “All x are y”) do assert the existence of their subject
[Carroll 1887, 19]. In Symbolic Logic (1897), Carroll insists at some length on
the purely conventional nature of any choice regarding the existential import
of propositions:
[W]ith regard to the question whether a Proposition is or is not to
be understood as asserting the existence of its Subject, I maintain
that every writer may adopt his own rule, provided of course that
it is consistent with itself and with the accepted facts of Logic.
Let us consider certain views that may logically be held, and
thus settle which of them may conveniently be held; after which
I shall hold myself free to declare which of them I intend to
hold. [Carroll 1897, 166]
MacColl would certainly agree on this conventional feature, but he disagreed
on what ought to be considered as convenient. Carroll paid more attention to
what he called “the facts of life” and did his best to keep his theory faithful
to common use in real life rather than looking for symmetry and simplicity
in his notation and calculus. The fourth edition of Symbolic Logic (which
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followed the publication of MacColl’s review) contains, however, several minor
changes and warnings which suggest that Carroll might have been on the
way to changing his mind. For instance, he opens the section on existential
import with the following notice: “Note that the rules, here laid down, are
arbitrary, and only apply to Part I of my Symbolic Logic” [Carroll 1897, 19].
We cannot tell, however, whether Carroll followed MacColl’s advice, as the
few surviving fragments of the second and third parts of Symbolic Logic are
silent on this issue.
Conclusion
Lewis Carroll and Hugh MacColl shared an interest in Euclidean geome-
try and symbolic logic. In spite of some fundamental differences and opposed
views, each benefitted from the reading of the other’s writings. From the evi-
dence provided in this paper, it is clear that each man’s work influenced that of
the other, leading both of them to adjust their arguments to make them more
precise. Ultimately, MacColl’s reading of Carroll’s Symbolic Logic “rekindled
the old fire which [he] thought extinct” and encouraged him to work again
in the domain of logic, as he told Russell. Carroll’s literary skills certainly
intrigued MacColl who enjoyed reading Carroll’s prefaces! In addition to clear
exposition and the unusual style that characterize his books, there seems to
be one more essential affinity that supports MacColl’s attraction to Carroll’s
work. Indeed, their exchanges show that both had a deep interest in the pre-
cise use of words. And both see no harm in attributing arbitrary meanings
to words, as long as the meaning is precise and the attribution agreed upon.
Carroll promoted this license in most of his writings, and MacColl made thor-
ough use of it in his later mathematical work and second-stage logical theory.
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